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Theorizing Institutional Change and Governance  
in European Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic 
  




After initial responses that appeared be a disappointing replay of previous crises, EU governance 
in the Covid-19 crisis may very well result in paradigmatic change toward deeper European 
integration in some areas, incremental change in others, or even reversal toward dis-integration 
in yet others.  It is therefore important to evaluate what changed in terms of policies and who 
governed in what ways during the pandemic.  This concluding article does so by building on the 
other articles in this SI.  It first sheds light on policy change during the crisis using a historical 
institutionalist framework, then on governance by asking which EU actors, intergovernmental or 
supranational, drove integration and how, using rational choice and discursive institutionalist 
frameworks.  Finally, it also considers the effects of post-functionalist politicization to elucidate 




In the decade prior to the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, the European Union 
had already had enough crises to, as the saying goes, last a lifetime.  Europe’s fast-burning crises 
started with the sovereign debt crisis in 2010, continued with the migration crisis that exploded in 
2015, and followed with the British vote to exit the EU in 2016.  The slow-burning crises also 
continued,1 including the on-going security crisis, the simmering climate crisis, and the steady rise 
of populist anti-system parties which challenged the existence of the euro, the EU, and the tenets 
of liberal democracy and rule of law in the EU and its member-states.  But the COVID-19 health 
crisis, which immediately morphed into an economic crisis, topped all of these other crises in terms 
of the associated short-term risks as well as medium and long term ones, the need for quick 
responses, and the unexpected ways in which this double crisis upended long-standing policies 
and processes in all domains. Every single policy area already in crisis was affected, including 
eurozone and migration policy, and many of those with seemingly settled policies and politics 
were also disrupted, such as in competition policy and health policy—as the articles in this Special 
Issue make clear.     
 
 
1 On fast and slow burning crises, see:  Seabrooke and Tsingou 2018 
The headline pandemic responses in the health and economic domains appear in great contrast to 
the muddling-through of previous crises, with their hit or miss policies that were mostly 
incremental and largely unsatisfactory because EU actors held divergent perceptions of what 
should be done, undergirded by conflicting philosophies, divided preferences, and divergent policy 
ideas.  Rather than the piecemeal (non) solutions of the past, the EU, after a slight delay that 
seemed to foretell a replay of previous crises, appeared to have engineered a paradigmatic shift in 
policies and processes in the health and economic domains.  This has not been the case in other 
areas, where we see instances of incremental change, sticking to the status quo, or even reversals, 
most notably on borders and free movement.  Such changes in different policy domains have also 
differentially affected European integration, with deepening integration in some areas, greater 
differentiation in others, and even reversal of integration possible in yet others.  
 
But whatever the policy responses and their effects on integration, we are left with the question of 
who is responsible for leading those responses.  Some scholars would argue that member-state 
leaders in the Council have been in charge through intergovernmental processes of decision-
making.  Others would insist that supranational actors like the Commission, the ECB, and other 
agencies have been in control as a result of their institutional competencies and administrative 
capacities.  Yet other would suggest that it is likely to be some combination of the two via more 
politicized dynamics of interaction.  Moreover, scholars also differ on how to explain why these 
agents did what they did, split between seeing the motivations for their actions in terms of interests 
and incentives or new ideas and deliberative interactions.     
 
In sum, the pandemic responses of the EU and European countries more generally leave us with 
two sets of basic questions:  first, what changed in terms of the policies and how; second, who 
changed those policies and why?  Answers to the first question requires analysis of the different 
policy domains affected by the pandemic, for which the neo-institutionalist framework of historical 
institutionalism is most useful for considering what happened in terms of institutional change—
whether paradigmatic, incremental, status quo, or reversal—and how this affected European 
integration—whether deepening, differentiated, or dis-integrative.   
 
Answers to the second question takes us to EU governance theories to investigate whether 
intergovernmental or supranational actors were the main drivers of the pandemic policy responses.  
As for their motivations, we turn to both rational choice institutionalism’s focus on interest-based 
incentives and calculations and discursive institutionalism’s attention to the construction and 
communication of ideas to explore the reasons and reasoning related to their actions.  
 
This article seeks to make two contributions to the literature while exploring the ins and outs of 
the COVID-19 pandemic crisis responses in Europe using the articles in this Special Issue well as 
other sources.  First, it shows that a methodologically pluralist approach, in which we use three 
different neo-institutionalist analytic frameworks, is most useful for answering a full range of 
questions related to pandemic responses.   And second, the article demonstrates that the pandemic 
has intensified long-standing trends in EU governance, in which growing politicization has made 
for new political dynamics of interaction among EU actors, and in EU integration, which has 
become even more differentiated within and across policy domains.   
 
 
Theorizing Institutional Change 
 
With regard to institutional change, our main question is:  how do we explain the changes (and 
continuities) in EU and member-state responses to the COVID-19 crisis, especially in light of 
responses to previous crises?  For help in developing answers, we turn to the neo-institutional 
framework of historical institutionalism, to explore the disruptions of (or continuities in) the path-
dependencies linked to the institutional rules during this critical juncture, asking whether new rules 
replaced or were layered onto old ones (e.g., Pierson 2000; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Fioretos et 
al. 2016), or if this was instead a case of paradigmatic change (Hall 1993; Skogstad and Schmidt 
2011; Blyth 2013).  As the introduction to this Special Issue suggests (Article 1, this issue), 
historical institutionalism can be well-placed to advance understanding of the EU’s adaptability, 
in particular during the critical juncture represented by the pandemic.  In some policy areas, rules 
were suspended, including the fiscal rules linked to the Stability and Growth Pact, the open border 
rules of Schengen, and the state-aid rules of competition policy. This could suggest status quo or 
even rollback as a form of dis-integration.  In other domains, such as cybersecurity and EU law, 
path dependencies were reinforced, allowing for incremental change toward deeper or more 
differentiated integration. In yet others, reinterpretations of the rules, new programs, and new 
agencies were created in domains such as EMU, industrial policy, and health policy, making for 
incremental deepening of integration or even paradigmatic change.  
 
In the economics of the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, Ladi and Tsarouhas (2020) chart the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)’s major break from the past, in particular in contrast to the 
path dependent trajectory taken during Eurozone crisis.  The EU took a great leap forward in 
economic integration during this critical juncture, which for the first time allowed for EU level 
debt, covered by the EU’s own resources to pay for EU initiatives.  Within a relatively short period 
of time, the EU went from the Franco-German couple’s proposal for a European recovery fund of 
€500 billion in grants to the Commission’s proposal of the Next Generation Fund of €750 billion 
with two thirds grants, one third debt, and then to the final EU Summit agreement for €390 billion 
in grants, €360 billion in loans (ibid.).  The EU’s pandemic economic response thus could be seen 
as representing a paradigmatic change with regard to the new EU level debt instrument, making 
for deeper European integration in the area.  That said, the fact that this is a temporary recovery 
fund rather than a permanent one means that this may not yet constitute the ‘Hamiltonian moment’ 
of a fully developed new EU fiscal paradigm.  That will be assured only if the Fund’s implementer, 
the Resilience and Recovery Facility (RRF), proves successful in spurring growth by funding 
member-state National Resilience and Recovery Plans (NRRFs), and that these then appear to be 
effective, efficient, and devoid of corruption.  
 
Similarly, in EU competition policy, Meunier and Mickus (2020) identify major breaks with the 
past in most areas, even if small changes had already been in the works.  Pressures had been 
building for change for a long time in the European competition policy regime due to trends in 
digitization, geopoliticization, and Brexit, but were met with Commission resistance or limited 
reform.  Once the pandemic hit, however, the Commission produced a well-coordinated response 
through reinterpretations of existing rules, layering new elements onto old rules, and the creation 
of new ones.  In anti-trust, the Commission created a ‘Cooperation framework’ to make exceptions 
for business cooperation; in state aid, in addition to suspending the existing rules it introduced a 
temporary framework to enable national governments to counter takeovers; and it established new 
EU instruments to deal with problems related to foreign subsidies in order to protect and promote 
European competitiveness.  The question here is still open as to whether the suspension of state-
aid rules together with the new RRF focused on spurring investment will lead to a major refocusing 
of such rules, say, on promoting industrial policy initiatives across member-states in areas of 
greening the economy and digitalization.  If so, this could entail a paradigmatic shift away from 
core neo-liberal ideas, long hostile to any form of government intervention via industrial policy, 
and toward more differentiated integration among member-states, as member-states define their 
own NRRF policies without worry about state aid rules.  The alternative is that competition policy 
will stick to the long-standing framework focused on maintaining a level playing field either across 
policy areas or in non-RFF-related areas. The latter course would ensure incremental change but 
no paradigm-shift.    
 
In the EU health policy arena, moreover, Brooks and Geyer (2020) find that the path dependencies 
that left the EU with relatively little capacity in this domain over the years have been broken in 
response to the challenges posed by the onset of the pandemic, with the creation of new agencies 
and capabilities.  The problem in this domain is that the EU was limited by design and generally 
inefficient, with minimal competences prior to the COVID-19 crisis.  This helps explain the mixed 
performance of pre-existing agencies once the pandemic hit.  For example, while the European 
Center for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) largely fulfilled its mandate by providing 
useful information to the member-states in a timely fashion, the Civil Protection Mechanism 
(CPM) was unable to facilitate cooperation between member states efficiently or effectively.  Here, 
complexity theory shows that in an early period little changed within a narrow range of choices, 
but that increasingly over time, as policies and institutions failed to cope with what was needed—
akin to historical institutionalist ‘drift’—and political decision-making became more uncertain, 
mixed complex decision-making became the norm, and with it greater need for policy coordination 
and public communication (ibid.).  Today, however, in particular in light of the Commission’s 
proposed new health agency, EU4Health, we may very well see paradigmatic change and 
deepening integration made possible by the deal between the Council and the European Parliament 
(EP) on the budget in November 2020. It restored a substantial portion of the funding proposed for 
the health agency by the Commission which had been cut out of the Council’s budget deal over 
the summer. 
 
In contrast, health policy in the international arena is unlikely to see any great leap forward in 
capacity.  It has long been characterized by even more limited competences and more modest 
outcomes than in EU level health policy (Van Schaik, Jørgensen, and Van de Pas 2020).  The EU’s 
long-standing lack of common strategy in dealing with the WHO was due in large measure to 
institutional membership by EU member-states (and not the EU).  The lack of coordination made 
the EU relatively ineffective in influencing WHO policy or reform and was weak in setting and 
funding clear priorities for the agency or in determining the leader of the organization. The 
pandemic, however, was something of a ‘wake up call’ for the EU, in particular as a result of US 
attacks on multilateralism.  Among the EU’s subsequent initiatives was its leadership in 
developing the main resolution of the virtual 73rd World Health Assembly in May 2020 on the 
response to the Covid-19 outbreak.  In this case, incremental change is the best for which we can 
hope, with little in the way of deeper integration, despite increasing EU coordination.   
 
In cybersecurity, rather than any major breaks with the past in the pandemic response, Carrapico 
and Farrand (2020) find an acceleration of existing trends with the unprecedented reliance on 
digitization, with virus-tracking systems and teleworking facilitating the response while 
cybercrime, disinformation, and infrastructure attacks made it harder.  Although the EU has long 
had little remit in this area, it nonetheless produced a wide range of policy innovations in recent 
years, driven not only by internal logics but also by external factors, in particular spillovers from 
major cyber-attacks as well as terrorism. New institutions and rules included the creation of a 
European warning and information system (CERT) and a European cybersecurity agency 
(ENISA), provision of research support for information technology, a push for Member States to 
adopt similar cyber security norms, and raising public awareness of cyber vulnerabilities. Much of 
this involves incremental change, although recent initiatives could lead to a paradigmatic change 
were these new agencies to gain significant EU level capacity of their own.  
 
In policy related to border control and freedom of movement, Wolff, Ripoll Servent, and 
Piquet (2020) find an acceleration of previous trends, but only during moments of crisis, in contrast 
to the path-dependent everyday regularities of the Schengen area and freedom of movement over 
the long term.  During the 2015 refugee crisis, only some countries, mainly in Central and Eastern 
Europe, precipitously closed their borders.  In the COVID-19 pandemic, in contrast, almost all 
countries closed their borders in an uncoordinated manner, with different policy measures and 
practices.  In the interim, the Commission focused its policy initiatives on closing the EU’s external 
borders and on minimizing disruptions to free movement through ‘soft law’ instruments. It also 
proposed the introduction of ‘green lanes’ to facilitate the ‘free flow’ of goods and transport as 
well as of essential workers along with healthcare professionals and patients.  This is perhaps the 
most likely case of EU dis-integration, given member-state actions that re-bordered the EU at the 
height of the pandemic.  But these were allowed under Schengen rules. And notably, during the 
second wave of contagion beginning in October, reimposition of country-wide or regional 
lockdowns did not involve border closures in most Schengen countries.  As a result, this arguably 
constitutes no paradigmatic reversal of European integration but rather a kind of wobbly status 
quo.  As for migration and refugee policy, the Commission’s October 2020 proposals for reform 
do relatively little of substance other than to reinforce border security related provisions while 
introducing somewhat more solidarity on refugee relocation, but with little in the way of even 
incremental change. 
 
In terms of EU law, finally, Terpan and Saurugger (2020)  find more path dependence to the good 
and the bad.  They argue that the CJEU’s successive earlier decisions on ECB monetary policy 
during the Eurozone crisis created a path-dependent case law that served to enable the ECB’s 
subsequent decisions in the midst of the pandemic.  In contrast, the German Constitutional Court’s 
decisions, including the German court’s judgment of May 5th, 2020 challenging the ECB’s 2015 
program of quantitative easing, formally known as the Public Securities Purchase Programme 
(PSPP), cast a shadow on the legality of ECB monetary policy during the pandemic, with the final 
judgment setting certain constraints to the ECB moving forward in the Pandemic Emergency 
Purchase Programme (PEPP) (ibid.).  It is therefore a toss-up as to whether such judgments will 
stop or only slow the ECB’s own incremental deepening of integration in European monetary 
policy.  
 
Historical institutionalism is thus helpful here in mapping out the continued regularities, 
incremental changes, and paradigm shifts prior to and during the Covid-19 pandemic.  But 
although historical institutional analysis does well to describe the kinds of new policies put in 
place in response to the critical juncture, it lacks the tools to explain them (see Schmidt 2008, 
2010).   Critical junctures alone do not determine whether paths change.  Relevant actors have to 
recognize that something is indeed a critical juncture, and that change is required.  This is why 
scholars who use historical institutionalism to describe what happened often look to other kinds of 
neo-institutionalist frameworks for help in explaining agency.  Many turn to rational choice 
institutionalism to explain agency in terms of the self-interested rational calculations of 
institutional actors who pursue their preferences within political institutions, defined as structures 
of incentives (e.g., Shepsle 2008). This can provide parsimonious explanation of actors’ interest-
based decisions in particular when preferences appear fixed and institutions stable, such as in the 
case of the WHO (Article 8).  However, in moments of flux when uncertainty is high and 
institutions unstable, it is hazardous to attribute interests to actors who often don’t know what their 
interests are, material or otherwise (Blyth 1997), in particular because these compete, such as 
health versus economics. This is why many scholars who provide historical institutionalist 
analyses of ‘what happened’ —including most in this Special Issue—instead add discursive 
institutionalist analysis of ‘who did what why.’  Discursive institutionalism focuses on the 
substantive content of agents’ ideas and their discursive interactions as they (re)conceptualize 
interests, (re)interpret institutional rules, and (re)frame norms through coordinative discourses of 
policy construction and communicative discourses of political legitimation (Schmidt 2008).  In 
sum, both rational choice and discursive institutionalism can lend insight into the reasons and 
reasoning behind what happened, by turning to the agents of change.  In the case of EU agents, 
however, we enter a different set of theoretical debates, concerning who can be credited with 





The main question for scholars theorizing European integration has long been: ‘who is driving the 
process how?’  Scholars tend to divide between intergovernmentalists who generally assume that 
member-state leaders in the Council are in charge and supranationalists who instead believe that 
the Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), or even the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) remain in control. Cutting across such divisions regarding who drives integration, 
however, are ones related to how such institutional actors drive integration.  While traditional 
intergovernmentalists and supranationalists both tend to explain actors’ governance in the interest-
based and incentive-related terms of rationalist choice institutionalism, the ‘new’ 
intergovernmentalists and supranationalists in contrast tend to explain such governance in the 
ideational and discursive terms of discursive institutionalism.  
 
In what follows, we begin with intergovernmentalism and then supranationalism, in each case 
considering (and even anticipating, in the absence of published work) both what traditional 
rationalist and new discursive institutionalist approaches would have to say.  We note in passing 
that ‘parliamentarists,’ traditional and ‘new,’ add the EP as an increasingly influential actor (see, 
e.g., (Hix and Hoyland 2013; Fasone 2014; Dinan 2015; Héritier et al. 2016; see discussion in 
Schmidt 2018, 2020).  But we leave out considerations of the EP here mainly because it played a 
comparatively minor role in the first nine months of the pandemic response and was not addressed 
by contributors to the Special Issue.   
 
Intergovernmentalism 
Intergovernmentalist scholars have long insisted that member-state leaders in the Council are in 
charge (e.g., Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1998). But they divide between traditional 
intergovernmentalists who use rational choice institutionalism to posit interest-based bargaining 
games based on member-state leaders’ coercive power (e.g., Schimmelfennig 2015), and ‘new’ 
intergovernmentalists, who employ discursive institutionalism to elucidate leaders’ consensus-
oriented deliberative powers of persuasion (e.g., Puetter 2014; Bickerton et al. 2015).  The latter 
see the EU’s member-state leaders in the European Council as much more legislatively active than 
in the past, having taken on an unprecedented ideational leadership role.  Moreover, rather than 
taking the traditional intergovernmentalists’ relatively uncomplicated view of the Council as the 
principal for which the Commission is the delegated agent, and therefore of little interest, the new 
intergovernmentalists see the Council as engaged in active attempts to reduce Commission powers.  
As such, they argue that the Council has been engaged in taking back control through the creation 
of de novo supranational EU bodies and instruments in which the member-states remain in charge 
through their representation on the governing boards (see Schmidt 2018). 
 
In the pandemic, all intergovernmentalists would agree that the primary focus of attention and 
investigation should be the meetings of the European Council, Council of Ministers, and Summits, 
where member-state leaders are the key players.  But beyond this, they differ on how to explain 
the actions of and interactions among those actors.   
 
In the economic policy arena, for example, traditional intergovernmentalists would naturally focus 
on the change of position of Germany, the Franco-German initiative, and on negotiations regarding 
the European Recovery Fund.  In this new context, they could argue that the new German 
preferences had changed the ‘game’ to a lop-sided battle between the ‘Frugal Four’ (Netherlands, 
Austria, Denmark, and Sweden) and the Franco-German duo, with the duo ensuring that they were 
able to impose their preferences, despite concessions to the other players.  Indeed, anecdotal 
accounts suggested that the Frugal Four had taken an extreme position, against allowing for any 
grants generated by EU-generated debt and in favor of providing only loans with conditionality to 
Southern European countries in need, in order to express their displeasure with Germany’s shift in 
position, to gain a range of concessions for themselves, including rebates on their EU budgetary 
contributions, and to play to their citizens’ resistance to grants.  The resulting bargains in July 2020 
help explain the Council’s elimination of the Commission’s proposed €7.7 billion to fund the new, 
standalone health program, EU4Health, from the Next Generation Fund (NGEU), (Article 3, this 
issue). Similarly, the watering down of the ‘rule of law’ conditionality clause, which had been 
pushed by the Netherlands, could be seen as a strategic ‘deal with the devil’ to ensure that Poland 
and Hungary would be on board for the final agreement. 
 
The ‘new’ intergovernmentalists, instead, would look more closely into the content of the 
negotiations while seeing them as deliberative interactions in which consensus-seeking debate and 
contestation produced the agreement.  In the negotiations, new intergovernmentalists would focus 
not only on the innovative ideas generated by the Franco-German couple versus the ‘old’ ideas of 
the Frugal Four but also on the persuasive ability of various leaders to move discussions forward.  
For the German shift in position, the ideas and discourse of French President Macron are 
particularly relevant, given his passionate pleas for a massive, coordinated EU response to such an 
unprecedented symmetric shock, in which no one was to blame, and some member-states were hit 
so much harder than others (Celi et al. 2020).  But other leaders were also important. On clinching 
the deal, other players were European Council President Charles Michel who, working through the 
night to conclude the negotiations and despairing of a solution, turned to Italian Prime Minister 
Conte, who was still awake enough in the wee hours to come up with the acceptable phrasing to 
clinch the deal.  As for why the Frugal Four were able to make their case effectively, we should 
mention the Netherlands’ earlier coalition-building with other smaller states to oppose a Eurozone 
budget proposed by France and partially agreed by Germany already in 2018.  The country was 
successful during the pandemic because it acted as a policy entrepreneur using a tactic of issue 
replacement in agenda-setting (Scheoller 2020) 
 
Equally importantly, new intergovernmentalists would interpret Chancellor Merkel’s shift as 
involving both a reconceptualization of interests and reframing of norms.  With regard to German 
interests, Merkel went from a narrow focus on short-term national economic interests 
(characteristic of the Eurozone response) to more enlightened self-interests recognizing the 
interdependence of European economies, in particular as her own automotive manufacturers 
clamored for an Italian rescue to shore up their supply chains in Northern Italy as much as their 
sales across Europe.  This was about more than just economics, however, since Merkel was also 
concerned about the political dangers of rising populist discontent if no coordinated action were 
undertaken, in Southern Europe as much as in the North.  But beyond the cognitive shift in interests 
were norms and values, or even emotions.  Merkel’s change of heart is arguably similar to her 
previous switch on migration policy in 2015 and on national nuclear policy.  
 
In other areas as well, intergovernmentalists, whether old or new, generally see member-states in 
the lead.  In competition policy, all intergovernmentalists would attribute the new industrial policy 
initiatives to intergovernmental dynamics.  They would see these as spurred in particular by 
Franco-German leadership, because they were instrumental in pressuring the Commission to 
accept a different policy orientation in merger and state aid policy, whether they explain them as 
motivated by commercial interests or ideology, and the result of bargaining or deliberation 
(Meunier and Mickus 2020).  New intergovernmentalists would add that member-state leaders 
prior to the pandemic acted as policy entrepreneurs to push for reform in the face of Commission 
inertia, all of which culminated in a 2019 proposal to modernize the European competition policy 
(ibid.). 
 
In policies related to border controls and freedom of movement, moreover, intergovernmentalists 
argue that this is a case where member-states renationalized policy without coordination or regard 
for prior EU agreements and rules-based practices, as they had done in previous crises (Van 
Schaik, Jørgensen, and Van de Pas 2020).  Traditional intergovernmentalists would explain this 
mainly in terms of member-states’ calculation of national interests. In contrast, new 
intergovernmentalists would consider the many different ideational frames of those engaged in 
responding to the crisis.  Wolff, Ripoll Servent, and Piquet (2020) show that EU and national actors 
mobilized many different frames both before the pandemic and during, including evoking 
economic prosperity or identity with regard to the Single Market; protecting EU citizens against 
threats in security; or bureaucratic efficiency and effectiveness on the one hand, solidarity on the 
other in the case of Schengen. In the pandemic, EU member-states mainly mobilized the 
international security frame to reintroduce border controls whereas the Commission and the EP 
almost exclusively employed the identity building frame, avoiding the internal security frame 
entirely. 
 
In EU health policy as well, when it comes down to who was really in the driver’s seat, 
intergovernmentalists (old and new) would point to the fact that in the European Summit 
negotiations, the pandemic-related ‘top-up’ funding for EU4Health under NGEU – was eliminated 
(Brooks and Geyer 2020).  And it was put back in in the final budget by the Council’s compromise 
with the EP. As for the international arena, intergovernmentalists might note that where member-
states are not collectively interested in an issue, as in the WHO, little headway will be made until 
they begin to take notice.  And when they do, which occurred once the pandemic hit, 
intergovernmentalists would note that France and Germany played major roles both in responding 
to the US attacks on the organization and in calling for subsequent WHO reform (Van Schaik, 
Jørgensen, and Van de Pas 2020).  Here, Van Schaik, Jørgensen, and Van de Pas (2020) use the 
rationalist logic of Hirschman’s ‘exit, voice, and loyalty’ to explain outcomes.  They find that prior 
to the pandemic, the EU did not show much commitment to the organization, as member-states 
tended to focus on their own diverse interests, by funding their own priorities in uncoordinated 
ways, but they did not exit.  Rather, they exercised voice, but in contradictory ways, by expressing 
support for a variety of different initiatives.  Their loyalty was therefore rather thin, and mostly 
symbolic.  Only once the pandemic hit, and as the US criticized and then pulled out of the 
organization, did the EU, as represented by the Commission as well as its member-state leaders, 
change their tune, with much greater exercise of voice in support and deeper expressions of loyalty. 
 
Intergovernmentalists’ choice of rational choice or discursive institutionalism to explain member-
states’ actions thus provide different but often complementary explanations.  Rationalist 
explanations offer enlightening snapshots of state actors’ interest-based calculations at given 
points in time, in particular by sketching out European countries’ initial responses, member-states’ 
bargaining games in the Council, and the EU’s minimal engagement with the WHO prior to the 
pandemic.  But such explanations have difficulty accounting for preference formation and 
institutional change, in particular why perceptions of interests shifted during this critical juncture, 
or how ‘real’ institutions persisted or changed, whether abruptly or incrementally over time.  
Rationalist analysis of national governments’ reactions cannot account for the rapid change of 
course in economic policy, as leaders quickly went beyond the limited bargains of the past to 
recognize the interdependence of their economies, the fact that the virus knows no borders, and 
the need to move to greater EU-level cooperation (Ladi and Tsarouhas 2020).  For this, discursive 
institutionalist analysis is helpful, as it delves more deeply into the ideas and values involved in 
member-states’ coordination with one another and communication to the public regarding the 
pandemic.  We see this also in the next section, in terms of supranationalists’ use of rational choice 
or discursive institutionalism. 
 
Supranationalism 
Supranationalist scholars do not deny that intergovernmental actors are in charge of major 
decisions, but they insist that EU technical officials are nevertheless in control of policymaking 
through their powers of policy formulation and implementation. But here, too, scholars split into 
traditional supranationalists, who emphasize officials’ interest-based exercise of institutional 
power via the dynamics of functional spillover and bureaucratic entrepreneurialism (e.g., Ioannou 
et al. 2015), and ‘new’ supranationalists.  The latter employ discursive institutionalism to stress 
EU officials’ powers of ideational innovation and deliberative persuasion (e.g., Bauer and Becker 
2014; Dehousse 2016).  While these new supranationalists might agree (with 
intergovernmentalists) that the older supranationalism of institutional power and leadership by 
technical actors in the Commission has indeed diminished, they contend that the Council enabled 
all supranational technical actors—whether the Commission, the European Central Bank, or other 
de novo bodies—to gain even greater institutional powers of enforcement than in the past, and this 
through the very rules passed by intergovernmental leaders which were proposed by these selfsame 
technical actors (see Schmidt 2018).  And there can be no question that the Commission as much 
as the ECB vastly increased their powers during the Eurozone crisis (Savage and Verdun 2016; 
Chang 2020). 
 
On economic initiatives in the pandemic, both sets of supranationalists would point to the roles of 
the Commission and the ECB as proof positive of the importance of supranational actors, although 
they are likely to emphasize different aspects of their actions.  In the economic policy arena, for 
example, supranationalists would point to the Commission’s innovations in setting up the 
employment support initiative (SURE) with its own funds and suspending debt and deficit rules 
(Ladi and Tsarouhas 2020).  But while traditional supranationalists might focus on the 
Commission’s actions as self-interested, to increase their power, new supranationalists tend to 
explain how they managed to create the news initiatives, through a focus on policy learning and 
entrepreneurs.  Ladi and Tsarouhas (2020) show that EU actors served as policy entrepreneurs who 
engaged not only in ‘single loop learning,’ which serves to correct existing problems, but also in 
‘double loop learning,’ which serves to modify norms, policies and objectives (Deverell 2009).  In 
the case of EMU, single-loop learning in the initial responses left the fundamentals of economic 
governance untouched, for example, as ECB President Christine Lagarde learned from the 
Eurozone crisis about the costs of delay and therefore quickly launched the massive €750 billion 
euro ‘Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme’ (PEPP) in mid-March, followed by an 
additional €600 billion in June. But double-loop learning, represented by the change in the norms 
of EU economic governance, occurred through the new options on joint debt issuance and generous 
grant allocations to states linked to the European Recovery fund, in which the Franco-German 
couple and the Commission served as innovative policy entrepreneurs. 
 
In the competition policy arena as well, supranationalists would emphasize the Commission’s 
supranational leadership in antitrust and merger threshold issues related to digitization, 
administrative discretion in its suspending of state aid rules, and entrepreneurialism in introducing 
new policy tools on digital platforms and foreign subsidies (Meunier and Mickus 2020).    But in 
this latter case, with a nod to the intergovernmentalists, the Commission would most likely not 
have done this without the entrepreneurial push from the Franco-German couple.  That said, the 
Commission also acted as a policy entrepreneur, in particular when producing innovative ideas 
regarding EU industrial strategy, or quickly suspending the rules on deficit and debt as well as 
state aid in accompaniment to member-states’ actions at the onset of the pandemic (ibid.).   
 
In health policy, new supranationalists also point to the Commission’s role as a policy 
entrepreneur, with its innovative ideas that reversed previous plans in order to propose the new 
Health Program, EU4Health, even if the Council’s role was crucial with regard to the overall 
funding (Brooks and Geyer 2020). But when it comes to vaccine policies, the supranationalists 
could convincingly argue that the Commission played a fundamental role in coordinating member-
state responses, although in this case raising questions about its support for international versus 
European efforts (Van Schaik, Jørgensen, and Van de Pas 2020).   
 
In cybersecurity, new supranationalists emphasize the Commission’s ideational entrepreneurship 
with regard to its steady development of cybersecurity initiatives, culminating with a strategy that 
led to policy initiatives and serious capacity (Carrapico and Farrand 2020). The Commission 
developed proposals for increasing coordination that slowly evolved into a comprehensive 
cybersecurity strategy, including ideational innovations in a number of different policy areas.  
Events already in 2016, however, constituted a critical juncture, as EU officials lost trust in social 
media platform operators, seen as not sharing the EU’s values with regard to freedom of 
expression, and harmful speech. And these problems were only exacerbated during the pandemic, 
with trust suffering greatly due to the proliferation of pandemic-related conspiracy theories, and 
the EU narrative suggesting that social media had not been sufficiently policed by online platforms 
(Carrapico and Farrand 2020). 
 
As for border controls and freedom of movement, this is a place where supranationalists, 
traditional or new, would be hard-pressed to say anything other than that the Commission arguably 
clawed back some administrative power through such ‘accompanying’ actions as the closing of 
the external borders while exercising some ideational persuasion via its evocation of economic and 
identity frames in its discursive interactions with the European Parliament and of solidarity frames 
with the member-state leaders (Wolff, Ripoll Servent, and Piquet 2020).   
 
But what about the ECB?  Is it a de novo intergovernmental institution, as intergovernmentalists 
claim, since its board is made up of the heads of member-state central banks (e.g., Hodson 2015), 
or a supranational one, given its independence and autonomy in deciding on monetary policy, with 
a strong President to lead, backed up by experts (Dehousse 2016)? Either way, there can be little 
doubt that in the pandemic response, its actions were taken as a supranational actor.  Here, 
traditional supranationalists would point to the interest-based self-empowering of the ECB, as it 
incrementally shifted from a strict interpretation of monetary policy to an increasingly expansive 
one (Chang 2020).  New supranationalists would add the discursive communications that created 
space for the new policies while legitimizing them, along with the expert communities that served 
as strategic support.  They might also draw attention to the policy learning of the new ECB 
President Christine Lagarde who, after her initial misstep when she said that it was not the ECB’s 
remit to deal with the spreads between German and Italian bonds, quickly announced the ECB’s 
new major purchasing program (PPEP) which dwarfed previous infusions, and without which the 
euro could have collapsed (Ladi and Tsarouhas 2020).        
 
Finally, as for the CJEU, supranationalists, traditional and new, would insist that this is another 
instance of the supranational exercise of administrative power and deliberative persuasion. Terpan 
and Saurugger (2020) show for the judiciary generally how judges can act as policy framers  
through their discourse (as elaborated through their judgments), making executive decisions more 
or less possible, and thereby serving as policy enhancers or policy constrainers.  In terms of 
judgments on ECB monetary policy, while the German Constitutional Court repeatedly served as 
a policy constrainer as it sought to limit ECB actions through its decisions, the CJEU continually 
served as a policy enhancer, by deciding in a succession of cases that the ECB had not exceeded 
its mandate.  To explain such differences between these courts, we can point to both cognitive 
interests and normative values.  While the EU Court has focused on defending its own prerogatives 
and displays a pro-integration bias, the German Court has been intent on resisting subordination 
to the CJEU and demonstrates a sovereignty bias (ibid.).  
 
EU’s Agents’ Increasing Political Dynamics of Interaction  
Although examining each of these EU actors separately enables us to apply the many different 
approaches in European integration theory to the crisis, it misses out on the EU response as a 
whole.  As integration has deepened, EU actors have become more interdependent, with long-
standing relations of cooperation now riven in many domains by greater contestation.  There is a 
deeper intensity of interactions among EU actors in struggles not only over interest-based power 
and influence but also over which policy ideas are deemed most effective and legitimate.  EU 
governance, in other words, has becoming increasingly politicized as a result of this new dynamics 
of interaction.  This has been particularly manifest in the greater pressure from intergovernmental 
actors in the Council on supranational actors such as the Commission and the ECB to do their 
bidding. But it has also been evident in the ways in which such supranational actors have 
responded, in some cases by attempting to deflect their attacks, in others by seeking to bring them 
onto their side (Schmidt 2019). 
 
Some scholars in recent years have sought to take account of such developments, but mainly in 
view of explaining the EU’s inability to resolve its many crises. For example, Jones, Meunier, and 
Keleman (2015) add a historical institutionalist, neo-functionalist component to the rationalist 
approach by describing the dynamics of ‘failing forward’ through which intergovernmental 
bargaining has led time and again to incomplete agreements and failed reforms instituted by 
supranational actors that soon require new intergovernmental bargains (ibid.).  While this approach 
explains past crises, the Covid-19 Pandemic would appear to suggest that ‘failing forward’ is no 
longer applicable in many domains, given the path-breaking initiatives and reforms undertaken 
that have led to at least the beginning of more complete agreements and more successful reforms.   
 
Pursuing another line of argument are Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2018), who take both 
intergovernmentalists and supranationalists to task for their optimistic view of the potential for 
further integration generally based on the experience of market integration.  These authors contend 
instead that integration has been stymied because it impinges on core state powers such as money, 
fiscal affairs, defense and diplomacy.  Intermingling traditional intergovernmentalism’s rationalist 
logic with traditional supranationalism’s neo-functionalist logic, they argue that integration of core 
state powers faced inadequate supply due to the propensity for member-states’ zero‐sum 
bargaining, a functional need for EU level capacities which was lacking, and high political saliency 
to mass publics on distributive interests such as taxes and security services, as well as on normative 
issues related to identity and democratic self-determination.  So how, then, do we explain the 
pandemic response?  Certainly, part of the answer would be that in the extreme externalities caused 
by the pandemic, zero-sum conflict was avoided in member-state bargaining, EU level capacities 
were enhanced, and mass publics had shifted their opinion on certain issues (Eurozone) but not on 
others (borders).  But how, then, do we explain how and why member-states overcame zero-sum 
conflicts to enhance EU level capacities and to convince mass publics on these highly salient issues 
to accept their agreements?  To answer this question, at the very least we need to add the discursive 
institutionalist logics of ‘new’ intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, focused on 
deliberative consensus-building and ideational innovation.  But it also requires recognizing another 
aspect of deepening European integration: the politicization of EU governance.   
 
Politicization has grown with the rise of Eurosceptic pressures in the member-states (Hutter, 
Grande, and Kriesi 2016), as theorized by the ‘post-functionalists’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 
2019).  This was also clearly in evidence at the national level during the pandemic. Across Europe, 
anti-system populist parties in many member-states decried their government leaders, either 
blaming them for being too late and lax on lock-down measures, or too harsh on mask-wearing 
rules and lockdowns.  In countries with populist governments, moreover, their leaders often 
exploited the crisis for their own political purposes, for example, to restrict access to abortions in 
Hungary and Poland.  Such politicization was not limited to the populist extremes, however. In 
many countries, mainstream government leaders publicly criticized fellow leaders not only for 
their country-level actions, such as closing borders without warning or forbidding export of 
medical equipment, but also for their EU level actions.  Italian leaders in particular excoriated the 
Frugal Four for their insistence on loans with conditionality for the European Recovery Fund.   
 
Politicization was also clearly in evidence at the EU level. The intense debates among Council 
leaders were not just about national or socio-economic interests, as traditional 
intergovernmentalists might argue (e.g., Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1993; Schimmelfennig 
2015). They were equally related to member-state leaders’ political concerns, whether in terms of 
catering to their own electoral interests or to their citizens’ attitudes and values, as post-
functionalists would insist (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2019; Hutter et al. 2016).  Political 
interactions also characterized relationships between intergovernmental and supranational actors.  
But whereas during the past crises, both Eurozone and migration, the politicization involved 
increasing contestation among EU actors, in particular as member-state leaders in the Council 
questioned Commission actions (Schmidt 2020), during the pandemic politicization led to much 
more cooperation in word and deed.  For example, in a major break with what the traditional 
intergovernmentalists saw as the path-dependent pattern of the Council seeking to take back 
control from the Commission, in the current pandemic the Council instead gave the Commission 
more power and responsibility, by asking the Commission to provide new ideas for innovations 
across policy areas and then giving it greater responsibilities, such as with regard to the European 
recovery fund.  
 
Among the different policy areas under discussion, politicization was ever present.  Politicization 
was certainly in evidence in the case of the German Constitutional Court’s judgment questioning 
the ECB’s actions in terms of quantitative easing (PSPP), which cast a shadow over its pandemic-
related monetary policy (PEPP).  In economic policy, moreover, politicization describes political 
leaders’ discourse as they sought to convince citizens not only in their own countries but across 
the EU of the necessity and appropriateness of creating (or not) the European recovery fund, with 
all grants, some loans, or all loans (Ladi and Tsarouhas 2020).   In competition policy as well, the 
crisis generated significant politicization around the EU’s reliance on foreign online platforms and 
vulnerability to foreign competitors that benefited from unregulated support, with public visibility 
enhanced by the discourse of France and Germany (Meunier and Mickus 2020).  Health policy 
was also on the firing line, whether in terms of the EU’s seeming incapacity to help out member-
states, or the WHO’s failure to act quickly enough along with its inability to provide reliable 
guidelines and support (Brooks and Geyer 2020; Van Schaik, Jørgensen, and Van de Pas 2020). 
 
So perhaps rather than continuing to debate whether intergovernmental actors are in charge or 
supranational actors are in control, we would do better to talk about a new politicized dynamics of 
interaction among all EU actors, along with the increasing empowerment of all such actors in the 
midst of the EU’s many crises (Schmidt  2018, 2019, 2020).  But could it be that, in contrast to the 
previous crises, where EU actors’ interactions were either depoliticized or increasingly politicized 
in negative ways, through contestation and zero-sum politics (see, e.g., Boerzel and Risse 2018; 
Schimmelfennig 2018), politicization has turned positive, with a new spirit of cooperation among 
all actors (already evident in certain areas like Banking Union—see, e.g., Nielsen and Smeets 





In evaluating responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, in sum, we benefit by combining differing neo-
institutionalist frameworks and EU theories of integration.  Deploying historical institutionalism 
provides insights into institutional trajectories, enabling us better to describe what happened and 
how this affected integration.  Rational choice and discursive institutionalism offers insights into 
actors’ interests and agents’ ideas and discursive interactions for both intergovernmental and 
supranational approaches.  By bringing in the increasingly politicized nature of EU governance 
over time, moreover, we are better able to consider the ways in which all EU actors are engaged 
in a new politicized dynamics of interaction.  This leads to two final questions:  What will 
governance look like in the future?  And what do the changing policy arrangements suggest for 
future European integration?   
 
Our answer to the first question generates only further questions:  Could it be that after the many 
crises that have dominated the EU over the past decade, the massive crisis related to COVID-19 
will push a move toward more normal politics and policymaking, beyond intergovernmentalism 
versus supranationalism, to a better balance among EU actors, including the EP?  And is it possible 
that the deeper political dynamics of interaction among all EU actors will make for a resurrection 
of what used to be called the ‘Community Method’ of decision-making, in which most decisions 
came through the ordinary legislative process in which all EU institutions were involved (Buti 
2020)—including the EP, which we have not had the room here to consider?  
 
With regard to the future of integration, we may already have some clues to the answers.  The 
Special issue clearly demonstrates through the contributions on different policy areas that 
incremental or even paradigmatic changes are occurring, most in the direction of deeper 
integration, with a reasonable amount of differentiation as well.  We find deeper EU level 
integration in a range of areas.  In the economic domain, the EU has undergone a paradigmatic 
shift on EU level debt through the Next Generation Fund (NGEU).  The suspension in the rules of 
the European Semester and state aid in competition policy might also represent paradigmatic 
change, especially were new or reformed rules to accommodate the industrial policy push of the 
NGEU; but incremental change allowing greater differentiated integration is surely in progress. In 
the health domain as well, we see paradigmatic change and deeper integration with the 
establishment of EU4Health agency, incremental change in other areas, but not in the international 
arena, where the status quo is most likely to continue for the WHO.  Incremental change toward 
deeper integration can also be seen in cybersecurity.  But we may be seeing at best status quo, at 
worse reversal of integration on borders for the weakly integrated Schengen rules on refugees and 
migrants as well as the fully integrated freedom of movement of citizens of the Single Market.  
Finally, judicial decisions of the CJEU versus the German Constitutional Court on the ECB suggest 
an uneasy equilibrium, where the judicial status quo is likely to be maintained even if the ECB 
may soon reach the limits of its incremental moves toward deeper integration.  Importantly, 
however, no definitive answers are forthcoming, because the COVID-19 crisis is continuing, and 
EU actors—intergovernmental, supranational, and parliamentary—are all working on ways to 
develop greater EU capacity even as national actors are seeking to improve their national 
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